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The Integrated Networks Model:
Explaining Resource Allocations in
Network Markets
The last decade has witnessed a shift from a focus on the value created by a single firm and product to an exam-
ination of the value created by networks of firms (or product ecosystems) in which assets are comingled with exter-
nal entities. The authors examine these market-based assets in the context of network markets and propose an
Integrated Networks model in which three types of networks—user, complements, and producer—add value or
enhance the attractiveness of the associated focal product. The authors empirically test the proposed model by sur-
veying information technology professionals on their resource allocation decisions regarding the Unix and Windows
NT operating systems. The findings suggest that the value added by these three networks is significantly and pos-
itively associated with resources allocated by business customers to competing products. The results also show
that the three networks mediate the relationship between stand-alone product performance and resource
allocation.
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1Ray Noorda, former chief executive officer of Novell, is cred-
ited with the term “co-opetition.” Brandenburger and Nalebuff
(1996) have taken it as the title of their book. The term describes
environments in business that require firms to compete and coop-
erate at the same time.
The breakdown of vertical integration due to forcesunleashed by globalization, technology, and the Inter-net has led to a dramatic shift in strategy toward vir-
tual integration of businesses and formation of horizontal
alliances to better serve customer requirements. Marketing
and strategy researchers have begun to examine competitive
advantages and value created by assets that arise from “the
commingling of the firm with entities in its external envi-
ronment” (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998, p. 2).
These intangible assets, called “market-based assets,” meet
the definition of asset but exist outside of the firm. In a sim-
ilar vein, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) describe mar-
ket relationships as a “value net.” Here, firms (competitors,
distributors, complementors, and suppliers) and customers
compose a game-theoretic co-opetitive1 environment of
interdependencies within a market. Rindfleisch and Moor-
man (2001) call such interdependencies between two com-
petitors for the purpose of new product development “new
product alliances;” Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) refer to it as
“cooperative competency.” Others have labeled these
market-based assets or networks “value webs” (Cartwright
and Oliver 2000). Under these frameworks, a firm, its
customer base, the makers of products and services comple-
mentary to its own product, and even the offerings of its
competitors are critical to assessing the strategic position of
that firm.
A central notion of market-based assets is that a cus-
tomer’s decision to adopt a product is often influenced by
factors other than just the value inherent in the product itself.
Chief among these market-based assets are networks of cus-
tomers, channel members, and competitive suppliers. The
firm’s ability to leverage these networks can have a signifi-
cant influence on the revenue and ultimate success of the
firm because in many markets—called “network markets”—
a significant portion of the utility of a product is created by
the existence or expectations of networks surrounding the
product (Besen and Farrell 1994). In this article, we further
explicate the concept of market-based assets by combining
it with work from diffusion (e.g., Bass 1969; Valente 1995),
adoption (e.g., Heide and Weiss 1995), strategic alliances
(e.g., Sivadas and Dwyer 2000), value nets and value webs
(e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Cartwright and
Oliver 2000), whole product concepts (e.g., Lambkin and
Day 1989; McIntyre 1988; Moore 1999), and network exter-
nalities (e.g., John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999; Katz and Shapiro
1985). We propose and empirically test a model of a buyer’s
resource allocation decision on the basis of perceptions of
these market-based assets or networks.
A wide variety of markets meets the criteria for being
classified as network markets. A network market exists if
users derive benefits from the following:
•The user network, or the extent to which the product is and
is likely to be used pervasively within and outside the orga-
nization. Buyers like to be assured that there is, or is likely to
be, a significant pool of product users in addition to
themselves.
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•The complements network, or the number and variety of com-
plementary products and services available. Buyers like to be
assured that a variety of complements (e.g., hardware, soft-
ware, services) are, or are likely to be, available in the future.
•The producer network, or the number and degree of competi-
tion among product vendors. Buyers do not like to be “single
sourced” and prefer procurement situations with multiple
qualified vendors.
Information technology (IT) examples abound, and
computer hardware/software and the fax machine are the
most common. However, examples extend far into other
contexts. The consumer entertainment market is replete with
network markets such as those created by entertainment
players and content (e.g., video home system [VHS], digital
video disc [DVD], compact disc [CD]). Consumer video
games are another example of a consumer network market
in which the user network creates a large portion of the value
of owning a box (keeping up with the Jones’s children), and
the quality of the complements network (games) drives the
sale of the focal product. Other examples range from finan-
cial services (in which a strong complements network
makes the provider more attractive), to automobiles (which
rely heavily on the complements network of service and fuel
stations), to telephones (for which users only receive value
when the user network develops), to diamond engagement
rings (for which the value of such rings has grown largely
because other users have validated the style; Conner 1995).
Network markets are often described as “tippy,” that is,
that “the existence of incompatible products may be unsta-
ble, with a single winning standard dominating the market”
(Besen and Farrell 1994, p. 188; Arthur 1989; Valente 1995).
Indeed, it has been argued in the literature that the value cre-
ated by networks can be so great that inferior technologies
(based purely on features, functionality, and technical per-
formance characteristics) are able to push aside or hold off
superior technologies. Cases such as the internal combustion
engine versus the steam engine, VHS versus Beta, and Win-
dows 95 versus OS/2 or Mac OS 7 are often cited as exam-
ples in which inferior technologies won despite arriving on
the scene later than a technologically superior incumbent.
The purpose of this article is to enhance the understand-
ing of market dynamics, value creation, and competitive
advantage in network markets. Our thesis is that buyers allo-
cate resources for the procurement of business assets (e.g.,
automobile fleets, IT, video systems) on the basis of a con-
sideration of the stand-alone product performance as well as
the user, complements, and producer networks.
We have two key objectives in this research and two pri-
mary areas of contribution to the marketing literature. First,
we develop the Integrated Networks model, a conceptual
framework of network markets, and define the three types of
networks that are crucial to understanding how consumers
allocate resources in network markets. Of the three networks
in our model, previous marketing research focuses on the
user network (e.g., Givon, Mahajan, and Muller 1995), the
complements network (e.g., Bucklin and Sengupta 1993), or
the producer network (e.g., Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh
1996). By including networks beyond the user network or
installed base, we extend the current conceptualization of
innovation diffusion, co-diffusion, adoption, and
intraorganizational adoption (cf. Bass 1969; Bucklin and
Sengupta 1993; Kim and Srivastava 1998; Mahajan, Muller,
and Bass 1990), showing that the complements and pro-
ducer networks also play an important role. Furthermore, we
propose that intraorganizational adoption is driven by the
strength of each network, as measured by five characteris-
tics: current size, expectations of future size, compatibility,
accessibility, and quality. Previous research on user net-
works focuses on the size of the network and expectations of
the future size of the network (e.g., Economides and Him-
melberg 1995). Our model’s richer conceptualization of how
networks create value extends previous work on networks
(Martilla 1971; Valente 1995) and network externalities
(Katz and Shapiro 1985) by providing more detail on the
types of networks and the characteristics of networks that
create utility and drive adoption in network markets.
Our framework focuses not on the initial trial or first-
time adoption of a product but on the extent to which a prod-
uct is adopted by a customer and the ensuing commitment of
new resources to buy additional units of the product over
time. Many organizations have a policy of trying emerging
technologies simply to be aware of options, but it is the
extent to which a technology is embraced by an organiza-
tion, the adoption intensity, and the corresponding commit-
ment of new resources or buying additional units during a
finite time period that ultimately lead to the success of the
supplier firm. Therefore, our emphasis is on understanding
how product performance and networks of users, comple-
ments, and producers influence the intraorganizational dif-
fusion of the innovation (Kim and Srivastava 1998).
Our second objective and area of contribution is in our
empirical test of the Integrated Networks model. Our empiri-
cal study provides an early test of the market-based assets the-
ory recently proposed by Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
(1998, 1999) by measuring consumers’ perceptions of these
assets and examining their influence on the buyer’s decision
to purchase a firm’s product. Furthermore, our study provides
empirical evidence of the power of networks to influence pur-
chase decisions and increases our confidence in research that
draws on the concept of network externalities (e.g., Kotabe,
Sahay, and Aulakh 1996; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
1998; Valente 1995) by operationalizing, measuring, and
empirically testing the Integrated Networks model as well as
the network externalities framework nested within it. A dearth
of empirical research in this area has prompted calls for
empirical verification of network phenomena (John, Weiss,
and Dutta 1999). By demonstrating that elements external to
the focal product can drive its purchase, the framework pro-
vides additional support for the concept of the “whole prod-
uct” (Lambkin and Day 1989; Moore 1999) and the possibil-
ity of market dominance by an inferior technology (Arthur
1994; David 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995).
Although the concept of networks and network external-
ities is well integrated into “street knowledge” and has been
examined conceptually and analytically, little empirical
work exists in this area (David and Greenstein 1990; John,
Weiss, and Dutta 1999). Our article differs from the empiri-
cal work that exists in four ways.
First, in one study our research incorporates all three
networks reported in marketing and economics literature to
play a role in driving product selection. Prior empirical
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research has examined either the user network (e.g., Econo-
mides and Himmelberg 1995) or the complements network
(e.g., Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Gandal,
Kende, and Rob 2000). We measure and test three networks
simultaneously: user, complements, and producer. We find
that each network plays a significant role in determining
resource allocation, even in the presence of the other two
networks. Furthermore, we expand the conceptualization of
network characteristics that compose the relative strength of
the network from two (size and expectations of future size)
to five (size, expectations of future size, compatibility,
accessibility, and quality).
Second, we increase the validity of the findings in this
area. Our research is based on actual perceptions of the pur-
chaser, not on aggregate sales data. We survey purchasers
regarding their perceptions of the three networks associated
with a focal product and with a competing product as well as
their perceptions of both products’ technical capabilities and
attributes. Previous research using aggregate data (e.g.,
Bayus 1987; Economides and Himmelberg 1995; Gandal,
Kende, and Rob 2000) assumes that network effects are the
“black box” between antecedent variables (such as comple-
ments or user network size) and consequence variables (such
as focal product diffusion or hedonic price) (Brynjolfsson
and Kemerer 1996). Although previous research indicates,
for example, that CD players’ diffusion is positively associ-
ated with the number of CD titles available, it does not indi-
cate whether consumers perceive that a greater number of
titles are available or whether the perception is tied to their
adoption or resource allocation. No such assumption or leap
is necessary in our study. We believe that by surveying con-
sumers’ perceptions directly, we greatly enhance the internal
validity of the previous work that uses aggregate data and
the external validity of the analytical work in this area.
Third, we examine network effects in the context of a stan-
dards battle: two products competing in a tippy market. Previ-
ous empirical works (e.g., Bayus 1987; Economides and
Himmelberg 1995) do not consider a competitive situation
and the “winner takes all” nature of these markets (Arthur
1989; Hill 1997). We not only examine perceived value of the
focal product and its networks but also measure perceptions of
the networks of the primary competing product to determine
how the relative strength of the networks drives adoption, pro-
viding insight into the competitive dynamics of a network
market. This provides an empirical extension of previous ana-
lytical efforts of network markets (e.g., Arthur 1989).
Fourth, our dependent variable is not a price index that
must then be interpreted as a proxy for utility or adoption
(e.g., Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1994, 1995).
Thus, there is no need to make a leap from hedonic price to
purchase. However, we do not examine only initial or first-
time adoption. Instead, we measure intraorganizational
adoption, or the amount of resources allocated by the pur-
chaser to the focal and competing products on an ongoing
basis. Continued purchase by an organization represents a
larger portion of overall sales than does initial trial or adop-
tion (Kim and Srivastava 1998). Therefore, it is more likely
to be indicative of product success in a tippy market.
Despite the large amount of analytical work in this area,
there has been little empirical work, and none that we were
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for this concise definition.
3For the purpose of brevity and readability, the term “product per-
formance” is interchanged for “stand-alone product performance.”
able to find, that operationalizes all of the key variables and
specifically measures consumers’ perceptions of the net-
works. Our study empirically validates the street knowledge
in this area and significantly expands the existing scope of
empirical study.
In summary, we make several key contributions to the
marketing literature. We offer a more comprehensive model
of adoption in network markets, focusing on three networks
that have not been examined previously in a single model.
We provide a richer characterization of these networks than
does preceding work in economics or marketing. We focus
not on initial adoption but on intraorganization adoption, or
the continued commitment of additional resources to a tech-
nology—the source of much technology spending. We con-
tribute empirical evidence on the power of networks by not
only testing the Integrated Networks model but also provid-
ing empirical support for market-based assets theory and
network externality theory.
The rest of this article is divided into four sections. The
next section examines the role of stand-alone product per-
formance and user, complements, and producer networks in
influencing the extent to which technologies competing for
organizational resources (share of purchases, budgets) are
embraced by organizations. The second section details
methodological issues. In the third section, we discuss our
results, and in the fourth section, we examine the contribu-
tions and limitations of the findings.
Network Markets and Resource
Allocation
Economists and marketers both make extensive use of the
term “network.” In marketing research, the term has come to
have many meanings such as business or social networks
(Iacobucci 1996; Valente 1995), but put most simply, mar-
keters consider networks phenomena that describe intercon-
nections among people or organizations.2
Economists arrive at a similar meaning, albeit by a dif-
ferent path. Although they originally used the term “net-
work” in “network externalities” to refer to benefits that
accrue from connections of physical networks such as tele-
phones or railway lines, the term was extended to include
value created by networks of users sharing compatible prod-
ucts or standards.
Figure 1 shows the four key constructs in the Integrated
Networks model that drive resource allocation: stand-alone
product performance, the user network, the complements
network, and the producer network. We describe these
subsequently.
Stand-Alone Product Performance
Fundamental to the notion of selecting one product over
another is the utility delivered by the product itself, inde-
pendent of the value delivered by any network. Product per-
formance3 is based on the features and attributes of the tech-
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nology as it stands alone, not utility delivered by the prod-
uct’s rate of diffusion, the complements, or other market-
based assets that add value to the product. It is this element
of utility that is considered when discussion of inferior prod-
ucts arises—the core technological value of the product
itself without external factors considered.
The User Network
In network externality theory, the size of the user network is
the key driving factor behind adoption decisions (Katz and
Shapiro 1985). Both in individual consumer settings and in
organizational adoption decisions, a network of previous
adopters is believed to encourage adoption among non-
adopters by making the product more useful, providing
opportunities for word of mouth and observation, or sending
a quality signal (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Hellofs and
Jacobson 1999; Martilla 1971; Rogers 1995; Valente 1995).
The influence of the user network is incorporated in
most technology diffusion models through the coefficient of
imitation or internal influence in marketing’s diffusion
research (Bass 1969). Early research on networks of innova-
tors describes the ways that technical information and know-
how are transferred among social networks of buyers and
potential buyers (e.g., Czepiel 1975; Martilla 1971). Czepiel
(1975) finds that communication channels link technical
decision makers in rival firms for the purpose of information
acquisition, validation, and verification. These networks of
innovators can include not only those making resource allo-
cation decisions but also the firms producing the product,
exchanging information with buyers to enhance the innova-
tion and thus increase adoption of that innovation (Håkans-
son 1987; Von Hippel 1988).
Research on market-based assets suggests that the utility
delivered by an established installed base can lead to faster
market acceptance of a product, not only through word-of-
mouth effects but also by lending an air of credibility to the
organization (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). This
accelerates cash flows, thus increasing shareholder value
and strengthening the competitive position of the innovating
firm. The positive effect of a user network can be so strong
and thus important to a product’s ultimate success that it
may be worthwhile to tolerate some degree of piracy to grow
the user base and develop the network externality benefits
(Conner and Rumelt 1991; Givon, Mahajan, and Muller
1995).
What is it about the user network that influences adop-
tion? In network externalities theory, economists state that
both current size and expectations about future size enhance
the strength of a user network (Besen and Farrell 1994; Katz
and Shapiro 1985). In turn, a strong user network increases
a product’s value and, therefore, the resources it attracts and
its likelihood of purchase, which creates a positive feedback
loop. On the basis of previous research in marketing and
strategy, we consider the following additional characteristics
that add to the strength of a network: compatibility, accessi-
bility, and quality.
•Compatibility in the user network refers to users either inside
or outside the firm who are important to the potential buyer or
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4DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149) describe isomorphism as
a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental con-
ditions.” Mimetic isomorphism occurs when firms become more
similar through imitation, typically under conditions of uncer-
tainty.
user for reasons such as opinion leadership or compatibility
(Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Rogers 1995).
•The degree to which the user network is accessible to a poten-
tial adopter (verbally, visually, or electronically) can deter-
mine the influence the user network can have on that adopter
(Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Valente 1995). Accessibility
is similar to Rogers’s (1995) concept of the observability of
the adoption and its influence on other members of the social
system.
•Although the quality of the technology itself is captured in the
product performance, the quality of a network refers to the
technological expertise, innovativeness, soundness, reliability,
and reputation of users who have adopted the technology. The
quality of the members of the user network can influence
potential adopters and future resource allocation by exacting
a normative influence on the potential adopter through opin-
ion leadership (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Valente 1995),
by signaling identification (Conner 1995; Solomon 1983), or
in a business setting, through mimetic isomorphism (DiMag-
gio and Powell 1983).4
Together with current size and expectations of future
size, these three characteristics compose a second-order or
higher-order factor that we call the strength of the network.
When these characteristics are measured in comparison with
a competing set of networks, we call it the relative strength
of the network. These characteristics help enhance the util-
ity a user derives from the networks and thus influence the
choice of product or technology in network markets.
H1: The greater the strength of the user network, the greater are
the resources allocated to that product.
Complements Network
The complements network is composed of products and ser-
vices that are needed to make the focal product more pro-
ductive or complete as part of a whole solution. The whole
product (also referred to as a product ecosystem or customer
solution) includes not only the focal product but also addi-
tional hardware and software, training, support, or other ele-
ments needed to create a “compelling reason to buy” (Moore
1999, p. 115). In technological innovations, the whole prod-
uct is essential to convince users other than technology
experts to purchase, or to “cross the chasm” (Moore 1999, p.
7). Marketing researchers have called elements that com-
pose this whole product the industry or product infrastruc-
ture (Lambkin and Day 1989; McIntyre 1988).
Just as members of the user network are linked by their
purchase of a common standard for a focal product, mem-
bers of the complements network are linked by their com-
patibility with the focal product. Complement makers such
as game developers for Nintendo are connected in that they
compete for a limited number of game licenses allocated
each year for a platform that is attractive because it is so
widely diffused (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). The
greater the number of complementary products (e.g., inter-
active games), the greater is the usefulness of the focal prod-
uct (e.g., Nintendo or Sega game console). In addition, dis-
tributors of the focal product (providing the complementary
service of distribution) are linked by the interdependencies
between inventories of focal and complementary products.
Similar to the user network, we propose that the strength
of the complements network drives resource allocation and
that the strength of the complements network can similarly
be characterized by its current size, expectations of future
size, compatibility, accessibility, and quality. The comple-
ments network is more compatible with the user when it
contains elements that are needed to provide backward com-
patibility with previous systems or interoperability with
other users that are critical to the buyer’s intended use of the
focal product. Complements (such as Universal Product
Code [UPC] labels and CDs) must also be accessible before
the focal product (UPC scanners and CD players, respec-
tively) can successfully diffuse (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and
Sengupta 1993; Sengupta 1998). The quality of the comple-
ments network can play a large role in resources allocated to
the focal product. Lotus 1-2-3, faster and more powerful
than its then-competitors, VisiCalc or Multiplan, became the
“killer app” for the original IBM personal computer (PC),
significantly influencing IBM’s emergence as the desktop
computing standard in the business segment (Carlton 1997).
The diffusion and intraorganizational adoption of the
focal product may be directly tied to the diffusion rate of
complementary products. Researchers point out the impor-
tance of thinking beyond the firm’s own borders. Bucklin
and Sengupta (1993, p. 159) posit that “Product strategies
based solely upon the expansion of ‘own’ demand where
complementarities exist may be suboptimal.” If developed
properly (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; Sivadas and
Dwyer 2000), relationships with these complement
providers can become an attractive market-based asset and
instrumental in the success of the focal product (Srivastava,
Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Thus, we include the comple-
ments network as a key element of our model.
H2: The greater the strength of the complements network, the
greater are the resources allocated to that product.
Producer Network
The producer network is composed of manufacturers that
produce products that are functionally equivalent to and
compatible with the focal product. Thus, this network
includes the original product producer and any other com-
petitive manufacturers that, through licensing or other
means, have been able to produce functionally equivalent,
compatible products. These products may be imitations,
clones, or generics. The co-opetitive role of additional prod-
uct producers can be critical to the ultimate success of the
focal firm’s product (Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh 1996).
Similar to the complements network, the growth of the
producer network can have a positive effect on product
adoption, relative to that of competing product ecosystems.
As more entrants compete within a single standard, price
reductions may result, increasing the size of the potential
market. Increased competition may lead to higher levels of
distribution and promotional activity, which in turn can
accelerate diffusion of the product (Kim, Bridges, and Sri-
vastava 1999). The addition of clones to the IBM-
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5Teece (1986, p. 287) defines the appropriability regime as the
“environmental factors, excluding firm and market structure, that
govern an innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an
innovation.” These include factors such as intellectual property,
whether the innovation is incorporated in a product or in a process,
and whether the innovation involves tacit versus codified knowl-
edge.
compatible PC camp not only drove prices and margins
down but also drew customers away from Apple’s Macin-
tosh. Cloners may have more experience with, knowledge
of, and capabilities for serving different markets (geo-
graphic or otherwise), bringing expertise and access to mar-
kets that the innovator cannot serve well (Conner 1995;
Robertson 1993). Furthermore, the existence of multiple
producers provides a second source to the customer, which
prevents the innovating firm from price gouging the user at
a later time, and therefore reduces the user’s risk in commit-
ting to a product (Farrell and Gallini 1988).
The network characteristics that make the user and com-
plements network valuable also describe the strength of the
producer network. As discussed previously, current size and
future size of the network influence utility. The producer
network is compatible with the user if the user has an estab-
lished, ongoing relationship with its members. A producer
network that is not compatible with the user can lead to
vendor-related switching costs (Heide and Weiss 1995) as
well as losses of utility associated with the termination of
existing vendor relationships (Morgan and Hunt 1994).
Research in channels and distribution emphasizes the acces-
sibility of producers (Magrath and Hardy 1991; Stern and
El-Ansary 1992). Different product producers may be
invited into the producer network specifically because they
are accessible to a particular group of users (Conner 1995).
Quality and reputation of the members of the producer net-
work contribute to the firm’s performance by influencing the
likelihood of focal product adoption (Fombrun 1996; Rao
1994).
Developing the producer network is not without risk to
the innovator. Under different appropriability regimes,5 the
innovator may or may not be able to control the develop-
ment of the producer network. Also, depending on the
appropriability regime, the innovator may or may not profit
from the producer network’s growth. In addition, the types
of competitors that enter and are successful at different
points in the product evolution will vary (Lambkin and Day
1989). However, it is expected that in most cases, the diffu-
sion of the focal product will increase with a more devel-
oped producer network (Lambkin and Day 1989). Conse-
quently, we hypothesize the following:
H3: The greater the strength of the producer network, the
greater are the resources allocated to that product.
The Relationship Between Networks and Stand-
Alone Product Performance
The Integrated Networks model provides insight not only in
understanding adoption and intraorganizational penetration
in network markets but also into the relationship between
the networks and stand-alone product performance in creat-
ing value for the user. Networks are unlikely to develop
around a product that is deemed unsatisfactory and unlikely
to provide some degree of value for the consumer. There-
fore, it is reasonable to conclude that stand-alone product
performance—value delivered by the technology, indepen-
dent of the networks—will influence the development of the
networks. However, it has also been proposed that after the
networks have begun to develop and deliver value, that value
can overwhelm the value uniquely created by the product
itself. Technological standards battles studied in previous
research include the QWERTY keyboard versus the Dvorak
keyboard (David 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis 1990,
1999), the VHS and Betamax contest (Arthur 1994;
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995), and the competition between
internal combustion and steam engines (Arthur 1989). The
relationship between product performance and the networks
suggests a mediation scenario, with the networks mediating
between the stand-alone product performance and resource
allocation. Thus, strongly networked products that are based
on lesser technological solutions are often adopted over
superior but weakly networked products because, we pro-
pose, networks mediate the relationship between product
performance and resource allocation decisions.
H4: The user network mediates the relationship between stand-
alone product performance and the resources allocated to
the product.
H5: The complements network mediates the relationship
between stand-alone product performance and the
resources allocated to the product.
H6: The producer network mediates the relationship between
stand-alone product performance and the resources allo-
cated to the product.
Methodology
We first describe our instrument and data collection proce-
dures. Next, we assess the reliability of the measures and the
discriminant and convergent validity of our constructs. We
then examine the association of the networks with resource
allocation and the ability of networks to mediate the rela-
tionship between product performance and resource
allocation.
Context
The context for this study is a network market. We chose to
examine a purchase decision made by IT professionals
regarding a high-technology product. We surveyed IT pro-
fessionals at major U.S. firms choosing between the Win-
dows NT and Unix operating systems. We chose this context
because operating system choice is typically a sufficiently
significant purchase that IT professionals are likely to con-
sider multiple attributes of the available choices. Also, IT
professionals have detailed knowledge of the competing
products and are able to assess the stand-alone technical
product characteristics and performance (i.e., the value
delivered by the technology, separate from the networks). In
addition, research in technology markets has focused on
similar key informants at the organization level (Gatignon
and Robertson 1989; Heide and Weiss 1995; Weiss and
Heide 1993).
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Because we examine a competitive standards battle, we
focus on the relative strength of the networks and collect a
comparative assessment of the stand-alone product perfor-
mance. Network markets are tippy markets, and competition
in such markets is appropriately analyzed by methodology
that recognizes the interdependencies between competing
products’ diffusion processes (e.g., Arthur 1989).
Instrument
We developed a questionnaire that was targeted at IT pro-
fessionals and pertained to their resource allocation deci-
sions in situations in which Windows NT and Unix were
both technically feasible options. The survey was initially
pretested by three IT professionals at a large university. We
modified the survey on the basis of their feedback and sub-
mitted it to a sample consisting of 25 IT professionals
enrolled in an executive education class. We checked initial
scale reliability and modified the survey again, on the basis
of reliability measures and comments (written and verbal)
from this group. The revised survey was then pretested by
three IT professionals at a Fortune-500 company, and we
made changes on the basis of their in-depth feedback. We
then administered the survey to the sample described next.
Sample and Data Collection
The sample consisted of 3000 senior computing executives at
large firms in the United States. The names were randomly
selected from a list of 5000 top computing executives, pro-
vided by Phoenix-based Applied Computer Research. These
firms belong to the Fortune 1000, Forbes 500, or Informa-
tionWeek 500 or they met at least one of the following criteria:
•They owned a mid-size or mainframe computer (an IBM 308x
or larger, an Amdahl, or Hitachi);
•They had 50 or more IT employees;
•They had an IT budget of $4 million or more;
•They owned 200 or more PCs; or
•They owned one of the following types of systems: CDC, Tan-
dem, Cray, Unisys A series, or DEC VAX 7000.
These constraints reduced the likelihood of surveying IT
professionals who manage only desktop PCs in which Unix
is less likely to be a feasible or realistic choice.
The instrument, a letter requesting the user’s assistance,
and an offer for a summary of the results were included,
along with a business-reply return envelope. Approximately
four weeks after the initial survey was mailed, a reminder
postcard was sent. Of the 265 completed surveys, 237 were
usable. A total of 65 other surveys were returned as undeliv-
erable or because the addressee was no longer employed at
the firm. This represented a response rate of 9%. Although
this represents below average survey response rates of top
management (Menon, Bharadwaj, and Howell 1996), this is
not inconsistent with studies of similar target samples (Peet
1998; Vedder et al. 1999). Adequately powered t-tests
(Cohen 1988) of means of key variables (network character-
istics, product performance, and resource allocation) show
no significant differences between those who responded
before (n = 194) versus those who responded after (n = 43)
the reminder postcard.
Measures
One goal of this research is to significantly extend the
empirical effort in network market research by providing the
first empirical measurement of consumers’ perceptions of
network externalities as well as of our proposed Integrated
Networks model. Our measures are not proxies for network
externalities, nor is our model based on aggregate data. We
survey consumers on the current size of the user and com-
plements networks and the expectations of the future size of
the user and complements networks, as well as the newly
introduced characteristics of each of the three networks:
compatibility, accessibility, and quality. Although the mea-
sures we develop are specific to our context, operating sys-
tems, we believe they can provide guidance for future
researchers in network markets.
Specific Decision Area
The first question of the survey was highlighted in a section
titled “Your Specific Decision: What Decision Are You
Making Today?” and asked the respondent to consider a
recent or upcoming decision. The respondent was asked to
select from a list or to write in the functional area of that
decision (e.g., CAD/CAM operations, accounting, engineer-
ing, design use). Respondents were told that this was their
specific decision area and were asked to answer all ques-
tions with respect to that decision context. Included in
nearly every item are the words “specific decision area” to
help ensure that the respondent reported on the networks
affiliated with the operating system and the attributes of the
operating system itself in that specific context. We did this
to encourage a consistent perspective by the user as he or
she responded to the survey and to avoid an aggregation bias
across decisions made in a particular year.
Resource Allocation
We asked the user to estimate the percentage of the operat-
ing system/application/workstation budget that was to be
spent on Windows NT–based services and goods and Unix-
based services and goods in 1998. Again, we instructed the
user to focus on the specific decision area he or she had indi-
cated at the beginning of the survey. We used the percentage
of this budget to be spent on Unix as the dependent variable.
Because it is a percentage bound by 0 and 1, we replaced
responses of 0 or 1 with near approximations (Cohen and
Cohen 1983), and we performed a logit transformation. The
transformed variable ranges from –5.29 to 5.29 with a mean
of –.85 and a standard deviation of 2.26. Skewness is –.15,
and kurtosis is –.01.
Assessment of Stand-Alone Product Performance
Stand-alone product performance measures the user’s per-
ception of the Unix and Windows NT operating systems as
independent technological products, separate from the net-
works surrounding these products. We asked the users to
assess the importance within their specific decision area of
ten technical operating system attributes using a five-point
response scale ranging from “not at all important” to “very
important.” The attributes can be grouped into three general
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6We conducted regression analyses that included the operating
system ratings without this arithmetic manipulation. We compared
these with similar analyses that included the collapsed measure.
The two yielded similar adjusted R2 figures and similar signifi-
cance for other variables in the equation, but we could not interpret
the signs and significance of the operating system attribute ratings
because of high multicollinearity among these items.
categories: complex computing capabilities of the operating
system (e.g., multiprocessor support, scalability, clustering,
high performance features), manageability of the operating
system (e.g., ease of recovery from crashes, security, ease of
manageability, networking), and robustness of the operating
system (e.g., robustness/stability, maturity). The list of
attributes was developed from an extensive search of techni-
cal publications pertaining to operating systems (e.g., Byte
1996; Edge: Work-Group Computing Report 1996; Informa-
tion Week 1997) and was pretested by IT professionals. After
users rated the importance of each attribute, we asked them
to rate each operating system’s performance on a scale of 1
to 5, ranging from “does not provide this capability at all” to
“provides this capability very well.”
For eight of the ten attributes, Unix was rated signifi-
cantly higher than NT (NT was rated higher on “ease of
manageability” and “networking”). To avoid multicollinear-
ity problems in subsequent analyses, we collapsed ratings
into one item that represented stand-alone product perfor-
mance. We computed this item by taking the Unix rating,
subtracting the NT rating, and multiplying the result by the
importance score.6 Thus, this is a relative scale in which a
large positive number indicates a belief that Unix is the
superior operating system and a large negative number indi-
cates a belief that NT is the superior operating system. This
value has a mean of 19.13, standard error of 3.75, skewness
of –1.15, and kurtosis of 2.93.
Perceptions of the Three Networks
We measured each characteristic of each network using a
multi-item scale. The items consist of statements such as
“This operating system has a sizable market share today in
my specific decision area” and are followed by two five-
point scales, one for NT and one for Unix, anchored by
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” We did not include
the current size of the producer network and the expecta-
tions about the future size of the producer network in the
instrument. Pretests showed that questions related to size of
the producer network cause confusion among users. Idio-
syncratic to this industry, each operating system, regardless
of its standard interfaces and alliances, is developed by a
single firm; therefore, we did not measure current size and
expectations of future size of the producer network in the
survey. We subsequently discuss scale refinement proce-
dures (final scales are provided in Appendix A).
Control Variables
Previous research in adoption has found other variables to
be associated with resource allocation decisions. Because
they are not the central focus of our framework, they are
included in our analysis as control variables. The first cate-
gory of control variables is associated with cost and includes
cost of heterogeneity (owning more than one operating sys-
tem), total cost of ownership of the operating system
(Rogers 1995; Weiss 1994), concern for compatibility
(Weiss and Heide 1993), and the financial switching costs
associated with switching from one operating system to
another (Burnham, Frels, and Mahajan 2003; Weiss 1994).
The second category is associated with the firm’s decision-
making process. These include the firm’s risk aversion
(Puto, Patton, and King 1985; Tellis and Gaeth 1990) and
innovativeness, measured as organizational centrality
(Gatignon and Robertson 1989; Mansfield 1968). Final
scale items are provided in Appendix B.
Scale Refinement and Analysis
To obtain a measure of the relative strength of one network
over the competing network, we followed the subsequent
procedure. For each item that measured a network charac-
teristic, we subtracted the response given for NT from the
response given for Unix, creating a relative scale in which a
positive number indicates a belief that the Unix operating
system scores higher on that particular item and a negative
number indicates a belief that NT scores higher on that par-
ticular item. Peter, Churchill, and Brown (1993) warn
against potential problems with the use of such difference
scores: understated or overstated reliability, spurious corre-
lations, and discriminant validity. In Appendix A, we show
the reliabilities of the component measures (measures for
each individual operating system) as well as the combined
scores (calculated as proscribed by Peter, Churchill, and
Brown 1993), all but one of which are at or above the .70
recommendation provided by Nunnally and Bernstein
(1996). The exception is accessibility of the user network in
which reliability is .66. Thus, we do not face the reliability
issues Peter, Churchill, and Brown caution against. Because
the individual measures that make up the difference score
(the component measures) are not included in further analy-
sis, Peter, Churchill, and Brown’s concerns regarding spuri-
ous correlations or discriminant validity are also not applic-
able. Peter, Churchill, and Brown also discuss a variance
restriction problem that is not applicable in these measures
because the measures do not have a “more is always better”
connotation.
The survey contained 71 items that measured the net-
work constructs. We submitted these items to the iterative
purification process recommended by Churchill (1979),
Gerbing and Anderson (1988), and Bollen (1989), consist-
ing of exploratory factor analysis, reliability analysis, and
confirmatory factor analysis. This process led us to retain a
total of 42 items, which are provided in Appendix A. Con-
firmatory factor analyses (Anderson and Gerbing 1988)
show that the measurement models fit the data well (normed
fit index [NFI] and comparative fit index [CFI] > .90; see
details in Appendix C). We checked the characteristics of
each network for discriminant validity to assess the unique-
ness of each characteristic by setting the correlation of each
pair of two measures to 1.0 within the measurement model
and checking the degradation of the χ2 measure (Anderson
and Gerbing 1988). We also tested unidimensionality and
convergent validity of each construct according to proce-
dures recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). For
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TABLE 1
Correlation Coefficients Among Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11
Relative strength of user network (X1) 1.00
Relative strength of complements network (X2) .80* 1.00
Relative strength of producer network (X3) .67* .71* 1.00
Stand-alone product performance (X4) .58* .61* .55* 1.00
Concern for compatibility (X5) –.05 –.03 –.03 –.12 1.00
Risk aversion (X6) .06 .07 .05 .08 .00 1.00
Innovativeness (X7) –.12 –.12 –.07 –.08 .04 –.12 1.00
Cost of heterogeneity (X8) –.35* –.37* –.30* –.37* .23* –.12 .12 1.00
Relative total cost of ownership (X9) –.08 –.08 –.07 .09 .00 .05 .07 .11 1.00
Financial switching costs (X10) .04 .05 .00 .05 –.15* .12 .01 –.21* –.08 1.00
Percentage of resources allocated to Unix (X11) .65* .60* .57* .49* –.02 –.02 –.07 –.32* –.03 .02 1.00
*Significant at least at the level of p < .05.
7Hess’s (2000) paper on unidentified recursive models is not a
factor in our model, as we have no correlated error terms.
the control variable measures, we used scale purification
processes similar to those used for the network characteris-
tics. Fit indices are provided in Appendix B.
For 8 of the 13 network characteristics measured, NT
was rated as having a stronger network than Unix, whereas
Unix’s networks were rated stronger in only two cases: qual-
ity of the producer network and quality of the complements
network. There was no significant difference between the
products in the size of their user networks, the quality of
their user networks, or the compatibility of their comple-
ments network.
Finally, we explored the existence of second-order fac-
tors of “relative strength of network” following methods
outlined by Gerbing and Anderson (1984), Bollen (1989),
Marsh (1987), and Rindskopf and Rose (1988). We found
that three second-order factors fit the data better than the
first-order factors on many measures and only marginally
worse than the first-order factors on a few measures. On the
basis of recommendations by Marsh (1987) and Rindskopf
and Rose (1988), we use the second-order factors on the
basis of their fit with the data, their theoretical attractive-
ness, and their parsimony (see Appendix C). Discriminant
validity tests (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) conducted on
the second-order factors show that the three second-order
strength constructs are distinct from one another. Correla-
tion coefficients among all variables are shown in Table 1.
We tested five structural models using AMOS 4.01
(Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). Model 1 is the full model as
is shown conceptually in Figure 1 (for clarity, Figure 1 does
not include the first-order factors, indicators, error terms, or
control variables).7 To test for mediation, we followed pro-
cedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986). Model 2
regresses resource allocation on stand-alone product perfor-
mance, excluding the mediators from the model (Path C in
Barron and Kenny [1986]). Models 3, 4, and 5 each regress
one of the mediating networks on the stand-alone product
performance (Path A in Barron and Kenny [1986]). In Mod-
els 1 and 2, in which resource allocation is the dependent
variable, the six control variables are included in the model
with single-item indicators and the error variances set to (1 –
variance) × reliability (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989, p. 153).
Results
We present the results in Table 2. Model 1, the full model,
shows support for H1, H2, and H3. In testing H1, we show
that the relative strength of the user network is positively
associated with the resources allocated to Unix (β = .32; p <
.001). In support of H2, we find that the complements net-
work is significantly and positively associated with resource
allocation (β = .21, p < .01). In support of H3, we find that
the producer network is significantly and positively associ-
ated with resource allocation (β = .34, p = .001). No control
variables are significant in Model 1. Thus, we find support
for H1, H2 and H3.
Testing H4–H6 requires information from Models 1–5.
First, we examine Model 2 to determine if the stand-alone
product performance is indeed positively associated with
resource allocation when the mediators (networks) are not
present. Model 2 shows that this is indeed the case (β = .47;
p < .001.) Second, we examine Models 3–5 and find that the
networks (the mediators) are indeed positively associated
with the stand-alone product performance: Product perfor-
mance → user network, β = .63, p < .001; product perfor-
mance → complements network, β = .57, p < .001; product
performance → producer network, β = .62, p < .001. Finally,
we examine the size and significance of the relationship
between product performance and resource allocation in
Models 1 and 2. Although this relationship is significant
when the mediators are absent (Model 2), it is not significant
in the model that includes the mediators (Model 1): Product
performance → resource allocation, β = –.04, p = .74. Thus,
the three requirements for mediation are met, and we find
support for H4–H6.
The only control variable that is significant in either Model
1 or Model 2 is “cost of heterogeneity,” which is significantly
and negatively associated with resource allocation (β = –.18,
p < .05) in Model 2, indicating that as the perceived cost of
owning multiple operating systems increases, the resources to
be allocated to Unix decrease. This is reasonable given the
encroachment of NT into Unix markets during the 1998 time
frame and resource constraints related to IT infrastructure.
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Discussion
Findings
In recent years, new theory regarding network markets has
been advanced (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998,
1999) simultaneously with a call for more empirical
research in this area (John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999). Our
research extends the theoretical development of market-base
assets and networks and provides empirical evidence on the
influence of such networks on intraorganizational adoption
decisions. In this study, we operationalize and test our con-
ceptual framework, the Integrated Networks model, that
explains intraorganizational diffusion and continued
resource allocation in network markets. Although many
markets are network markets, in this study we test our
model in the operating system marketplace. The results
show that networks can be characterized by five dimen-
sions—size, expectations of future size, compatibility,
accessibility, and quality—that can be represented by a
higher-order factor of network strength. We find that each of
the three networks—user, complements, and producer—is
positively and significantly associated with resource
allocation.
Furthermore, we find that the networks mediate the rela-
tionship between product performance and resource alloca-
tion. Thus, in a network market, the direct effect of stand-
alone product performance on resource allocation may be
insignificant. We posit that this is due to mediation by the
strength of the networks, and our findings support this. Of
the ten stand-alone product performance attributes we mea-
sure, Unix outperforms NT on eight, suggesting that respon-
dents believe it to be the superior operating system. If prod-
uct performance were the driving determinant of product
adoption, we would expect Unix to be the favored choice.
However, on average in 1998, 61% of the budget of each
respondent was spent on NT. In addition, those who rated
Unix’s product performance superior, but perceived NT’s
networks stronger, were more than twice as likely to allocate
resources to NT, compared with Unix. Why would this be
the case? Our model suggests that it is due to the relative
strength of the networks associated with NT and the net-
works’ mediation of the effect of product performance on
resource allocation. Of the 13 network characteristics we
measure, NT outperforms Unix on eight of these measures,
and Unix’s networks rate stronger than NT’s in only two
cases. Thus, we present this as empirical evidence that in a
market in which networks matter, the relative strength of the
networks presents an important influence on purchase deci-
sions and thus presents a mechanism by which a less pre-
ferred technology can gain market share.
Theoretical Contributions
This research makes several key contributions to the mar-
keting literature. First, this article contributes a model of
adoption in a network market that builds on our understand-
ing of diffusion, adoption, and resource allocation. It
extends our knowledge on what networks exist and influ-
ence adoption decisions as well as how those networks can
be characterized. We contribute to the work in market-based
assets and the “whole product” concept (Lambkin and Day
1989; McIntyre 1988; Moore 1999; Srivastava, Shervani,
and Fahey 1998, 1999) by explicating the assets that exist in
the marketplace and complete a technological product offer-
ing. We extend research in diffusion (e.g., Bass 1969; Maha-
jan, Muller, and Bass 1990) by suggesting that the coeffi-
cient of imitation, appropriate for aggregate models, can be
augmented with other network characteristics when data
from consumers can be gathered, which provides a richer
characterization of the installed base (user network) and the
way it influences consumer decisions. Furthermore, we
show that both the complements and the producer networks
can be as relevant as the user network in determining
resource allocation. Most important, we show that when
considered in one model, all three networks play a signifi-
cant role in determining how consumers allocate their
resources. Each of these three networks can be characterized
by its current size, expectations of its future size, its com-
patibility and accessibility to the potential adopter, and the
quality of its members. These characteristics determine the
strength of the network.
We examine not first-time adoption or trial but rather
intraorganizational adoption or the continued commitment
of resources to a product or platform. The degree of
intraorganizational adoption is more critical in determining
the success of a product, because most sales of technologi-
cal products are additional purchases by firms that have
already tried the product (Kim and Srivastava 1998). There-
fore, we examine continued resource allocation of two com-
peting products.
Second, we advance the field’s understanding beyond
that which was previously analytically modeled to that
which is empirically validated, providing future researchers
with an expanded model of how purchase decisions are
made in network markets (Arthur 1989; John, Weiss, and
Dutta 1999). Our study further defines and provides an
empirical examination of market-base assets (Srivastava,
Shervani, and Fahey 1998, 1999) and demonstrates the
influence of these firm-external assets on purchase deci-
sions. In addition, this article contributes an empirical vali-
dation of the Integrated Networks model as well as the pre-
ceding model of network externalities. Prior to this study, a
direct measure of consumers’ perceptions of network exter-
nalities has not been undertaken, and analytical models have
dominated (John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999). The empirical
research previously undertaken relies primarily on aggregate
data (e.g., Economides and Himmelberg 1995; Gandal,
Kende, and Rob 2000); however, we directly measure con-
sumers’ perceptions of the characteristics of the three net-
works and their relationship with resource allocation deci-
sions. This complements prior analytical and aggregate
work and also extends that work significantly.
Third, in demonstrating that the networks mediate the
relationship between the product performance and resource
allocation, we provide evidence that with strong networks, a
less-preferred technology may gain increased market share
through the value delivered by its networks (Arthur 1989;
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Valente 1995). Again, this
further validates the criticality of managing the market-
based assets in a network market.
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Managerial Implications
Managers in network markets can draw many lessons from
the Integrated Networks model. First, the framework
encourages managers to develop not just the user network
(as would network externalities or diffusion), but the com-
plements and producer networks as well. All three types of
market-based assets aid in creating a whole product, allow-
ing the firm to “cross the chasm” by attracting early major-
ity adopters crucial to product success. The Sega Dreamcast
game system, introduced in 1998 and widely regarded as
superior to other gaming consoles at the time, failed to reach
expected sales levels because game developers (Sega
included) were unable to introduce enough games (comple-
ments) simultaneously with the console. The market quickly
tipped away from Sega Dreamcast, and Sega ultimately
exited the market. One reason often cited for the VHS’s tri-
umph over the Sony Betamax was Matsushita’s willingness
to grow the producer network by licensing its design,
whereas Sony chose to remain a sole provider. Again, the
market tipped toward the product with the stronger network.
Second, the recognition of network strength as the
underlying construct composed of multiple first-order con-
structs expands the strategic levers available to managers in
network markets. Instead of solely increasing the size of the
networks or influencing expectations regarding the future
size of the networks as might be suggested by the original
network externalities theory, the Integrated Networks model
encourages managers to develop the networks on several
dimensions, seeking users, complements, and producers that
are compatible with the adopter, accessible to the adopter,
and of the appropriate quality to provide utility to the
adopter. For example, the diffusion of high-definition televi-
sion has largely depended on the complements network, not
only broadcast programming as is commonly cited but also
other forms of digital input such as DVD players (Heller
2001).
Such implications apply to both entrant and incumbent
firms. In our study, Windows NT (the workstation operating
system entrant) had not surpassed the incumbent (Unix) on
stand-alone technological performance. Nevertheless, our
findings show that IT professionals intended to allocate a
larger portion of their resources to NT rather than Unix,
because of the strong networks Microsoft developed around
NT. Thus, when an entrant’s product is able to perform ade-
quately (we do not mean to suggest that an unusable prod-
uct can succeed solely through its networks), its managers
should quickly address the market-based assets or networks
associated with the product.
Likewise, an incumbent must protect its networks from
encroachment by entrants. Our study reinforces the notion
that having a superior product is not enough. Long-dominant
game console makers Sony and Nintendo have worked dili-
gently to strengthen their networks in the face of Microsoft’s
entrance to their network market with the X-Box. Microsoft’s
action in the desktop market demonstrates its own belief that
its networks are crucial. In 1995, Microsoft was the incum-
bent in the desktop operating systems market, and it fought
fiercely to protect its networks against Netscape’s browser,
which threatened to break the applications barrier to entry
Microsoft constructed. Microsoft ensured a growing user net-
work (consumers) by wielding its power with one of its key
complements, computer manufacturers. By encouraging the
manufacturers to put Internet Explorer (and only Internet
Explorer) on the desktop and by bundling Internet Explorer
with Windows, Microsoft significantly degraded consumers’
accessibility to desktop-entrant Netscape. Microsoft’s will-
ingness to use legally risky tactics shows the criticality it
attached to maintaining its strong networks.
Limitations
The results of the study must be considered together with its
limitations. We conducted the study using single respon-
dents from a sample of large firms regarding resource allo-
cation in a single product market. For generalizable conclu-
sions, we would need to establish the effects across a
broader cross-section of goods and services. To assess the
generalizability of the scales, we would need to establish
their reliability as well as their convergent and discriminant
validity in multiple contexts. Thus, we do not have evidence
that our findings are not context specific.
Our empirical setting, operating systems, has strong net-
work effects relative to other markets. Operating systems
alone provide critical functions but rely heavily on comple-
ments such as application software, hardware, and user
skills to be truly useful. Furthermore, one of the main func-
tions of computing today is connectivity, and therefore the
importance of users owning compatible systems may be
exaggerated in this context when compared with markets
that are further removed from the concept of a physical net-
work providing the infrastructure links between network
elements. When applying the results of this study to other
contexts, the importance of networks in each context should
be considered.
It is idiosyncratic that there is only one producer of one
of the technologies (Microsoft’s Windows NT) and multiple
product producers of the other (e.g., IBM’s AIX, Sun’s
Solaris, Hewlett-Packard’s HP-UX) in this market. There-
fore, we did not measure the current size or the expectations
of future size of the producer network. This may also limit
the generalizability of the results.
Further Research
Economists have assumed that the growth of the user net-
work precedes that of the complements and producer net-
works, but strategic maneuvering by firms to attract com-
plements (such as electronic games) prior to focal product
availability suggests otherwise. Future studies might inves-
tigate the interdependencies among the networks and the
influence each network has on the development of the other
two.
Contingency variables are likely to delineate various
competitive scenarios within network markets. What com-
petitive environments make particular aspects of the Inte-
grated Networks model more critical for success, more
amenable to favorable strategic manipulation, or more open
to threats by other firms? The extensions the Integrated Net-
works model makes to network externality research will
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shed light on the strategic levers that can be used by man-
agers of firms sponsoring a particular technology. The use of
the Integrated Networks model in other empirical contexts
in which networks are likely to be more and less important
will validate the axes along which the model provides mean-
ingful insights.
Finally, research conducted from the perspective of the
technology-sponsoring firm would also provide insight into
network markets and standards battles. Combined with the
Integrated Networks model, investigations of technological
bandwagons, standard-setting alliances, and standards com-
mittees provide a starting point for such research. The share-
holder value created by such market-based assets could then
be more accurately assessed. Likewise, research on comple-
mentary product strategies (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Sen-
gupta 1998; Teece 1986) and licensing activities (Conner
1995; Farrell and Gallini 1988; Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh
1996) would provide insight into how a firm might proceed in
attempting to develop networks, increase adoption and
resource allocation, and make its product the de facto standard.
As researchers continue to examine network business
markets, and as the question of dominant inferior technolo-
gies continues to be raised, the Integrated Networks model
should aid in future empirical work and in future theory
building. Our work complements research on market-based
assets (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998), the value net
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), and the value web
(Cartwright and Oliver 2000), emphasizing a whole product
or product ecosystem perspective to providing the customer
with a complete solution (Lambkin and Day 1989; Moore
1999). Network markets represent a significant portion of
the world’s economy, and understanding such markets
becomes more critical to managing that segment of the
economy. As firms continue to address adoption issues in
network markets, this expanded view of the forces behind
these markets should aid in the decision-making process.
Appendix A
Network Final Scale Items, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Loadings, and Cronbach’s Alpha
Coefficient*
User Network
Current Size: Difference Score α = .80, Unix α =
.80, NT α = .77
.79** Today, this operating system has the largest
installed base of users in my specific decision
area.
.82 This operating system has a sizable market share
today in my specific decision area.
.73 The larger market share worldwide in my specific
decision area is currently held by this operating
system.
Expectations of Future Size: Difference Score α =
.93, Unix α = .93, NT α = .93
.87 In the future, I expect this operating system to
have the most users in my specific decision area.
.84 In the future, this operating system will probably
have a larger market share than any of its
competitors in my specific decision area.
.89 Over the next few years, I think more and more IT
professionals in my specific decision area will
choose this operating system for their use.
.84 In the future, this operating system is likely to
attract many more users in my specific decision
area.
.82 Over the next few years, I expect the installed
base for this operating system to grow rapidly in
my specific decision area.
Compatibility: Difference Score α = .89, Unix α =
.91, NT α = .89
.90 People in our firm currently use this operating
system.
.92 People in our firm, within my specific decision
area, currently use this operating system.
.85 Outside of my specific decision area, there are
many people in our firm with whom I need to be
compatible, who use this operating system.
Accessibility: Difference Score α = .66, Unix α =
.87, NT α = .87
.81 Currently, it is easy to find members of this
operating system’s installed base to help me make
decisions regarding this operating system.
.85 It is easy to contact members of the installed base
who have adopted this operating system.
.87 If I need information about this operating system, I
can readily find a member of the installed base to
provide that information.
Quality: Difference Score α = .88, Unix α = .92,
NT α = .89
.89 Today, IT professionals in my specific decision
area who are “in the know” about technology use
this operating system.
.78 IT professionals who currently know a lot about
operating systems have chosen this operating
system.
.85 IT professionals in my specific decision area
whose opinions I respect use this operating
system.
.81 IT professionals in firms that lead our industry
today have adopted this operating system.
Complements Network
Current Size: Difference Score α = .85, Unix α =
.89, NT α = .87
.88 Today, there is a great deal of hardware, software,
skills, and support in my decision area available
for this operating system.
.79 At this time, this operating system has the largest
amount of hardware, software, skills, and support
available for my specific decision.
.83 Today, most hardware, software, skills, and
support for my specific decision area are
compatible with this operating system.
Expectations of Future Size: Difference Score α =
.86, Unix α = .90, NT α = .90
.85 Over the next few years, more and more
hardware, software, skills, and support for my
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specific decision area will be compatible with this
operating system.
.89 In the future, I believe that this operating system
will have more hardware, software, skills and
support than its competitors.
.86 Over the next few years, I expect the amount of
hardware, software, skills, and support to grow
very rapidly for this operating system.
Compatibility: Difference Score α = .71, Unix α =
.83, NT α = .78
.73 The hardware, software, skills, and support
needed for backward compatibility in my specific
decision are compatible with this operating system
today.
.83 Most hardware, software, skills, and support that I
need for my specific decision today are available
for this operating system.
.71 Hardware, software, skills, and support that my
area currently needs in order to interact with other
units in my firm are available for this operating
system.
Accessibility: Difference Score α = .77, Unix α =
.86, NT α = .85
.78 The hardware, software, skills, and support for this
operating system are well distributed or widely
available.
.71 I have seen many ads for hardware, software,
skills, and support for this operating system
related to my specific decision.
.85 Today, it is easy to get help with hardware,
software, skills, and support for this operating
system.
Quality: Difference Score α = .78, Unix α = .86,
NT α = .82
.79 The hardware, software, skills, and support for this
operating system in my specific decision area are
generally of very high quality.
*“Difference Score” signifies the coefficient alpha of the difference scores (computed as recommended by Peter, Churchill, and Brown 1993),
“Unix” signifies the coefficient alpha of the Unix measures, “NT” signifies the coefficient alpha of the NT measures.
**This column contains CFA loadings, all significant at the p < .05 level.
Appendix A
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.84 The hardware, software, skills, and support
available for this operating system are highly
reliable.
.76 The hardware, software, skills, and support
available for this operating system are the most
technologically advanced for my specific decision
area.
Producer Network
Compatibility: Difference Score α = .77, Unix α =
.90, NT α = .77
.80 I already have a good working relationship with
the firm(s) that develop this operating system.
.76 I have service contracts with the firm(s) that
develop this operating system.
.78 I already have procedures established for
purchasing from the firm(s) that develop this
operating system.
Accessibility: Difference Score α = .71, Unix α =
.84, NT α = .86
.86 I am currently familiar with the firm(s) that develop
this operating system.
.54 I have seen many ads by the firm(s) that develop
this operating system.
.58 Today, this operating system is widely distributed
and is easy to obtain.
Quality: Difference Score α = .84, Unix α = .91,
NT α = .86
.88 Firms whose quality I respect develop this
operating system.
.77 The firm(s) that develop this operating system
has/have a reputation for knowing a great deal
about operating systems.
.85 Firms that I trust develop this operating system.
Decision-Making Variables: χ213 = 19.53; NFI = .99; CFI =
.99
Risk Aversion: α = .70
.37* My firm is the type of firm that often tries new IT
products at least once.
.65 When my firm buys IT prod-ucts, it buys only well-
established brands. (R)
.76 My firm is cautious in trying new/different IT
products. (R)
.68 My firm does not like to buy something unknown
where there is the risk of making a mistake. (R)
Innovativeness: α = .82
.69 When existing rules and procedures are not
adequate to make an IT decision, instructions are
requested from senior IT management.
.81 When problems arise in the technology selection
Appendix B
Control Variable Final Scale Items, CFA Loadings, and Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient
process, the decision maker goes to senior IT
management for an answer.
.84 When an unusual situation is encountered in the
IT decision-making process, senior IT
management is consulted before moving forward.
Cost Variables: χ224 = 86.39; NFI = .92; CFI = .94
Concern for Compatibility: α = .68
.56 When my firm considers which operating system
to purchase, compatibility with our existing
systems is not an issue.
.55 Technically speaking, we are concerned about
how compatible this operating system will be with
the other computer-based systems in our firm.
.87 System compatibility is not an issue as we
consider adopting an operating system.
Cost of Heterogeneity: α = .89
.77 It is much less expensive for us to use only one
operating system, either Windows NT or Unix,
than to use both.
.93 Our installation costs are much lower if we
standardize on a single operating system.
.88 Our training costs are much lower if we have only
one operating system in our decision environment.
Financial Switching Costs: α = .66
.55 Switching to a new operating system would
require us to spend a great deal of money on new
hardware.
.69 Switching to a new operating system would
require us to spend a great deal of money on new
application software.
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*This column contains CFA loadings, all significant at the p < .05 level.
Notes: (R) = reverse scored.
.65 Switching to a new operating system would be
very expensive in terms of restructuring our
system maintenance and our help desk facilities.
Relative Total Cost of Ownership—Formative Scale
End points of “not at all expensive” and “very expensive”
•The street price of the operating system itself and the
hardware on which it runs, per seat.
•The cost of installing the operating system and its
associated hardware in your decision environment.
•The cost of maintaining the operating system and its
associated hardware (e.g., system administration,
system back-ups, operating system upgrades, new
application installation, and upgrades).
•The cost of providing a “help desk” to the users in your
decision environment.
•The cost of training users in your decision environment.
Appendix B
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Appendix C
First- and Second-Order Factor Fit Indices and Comparison of χ2
User Complements Producer
Network Network Network
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
CFI .96 .95 .95 .95 .97 .97
NFI .92 .92 .92 .93 .95 .95
Incremental fit index .96 .95 .95 .95 .97 .97
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) .89 .88 .90 .89 .96 .96
Adjusted GFI .85 .85 .86 .84 .92 .92
Parsimony GFI .65 .67 .60 .63 .51 .51
Parsimony NFI .76 .78 .70 .73 .63 .63
Root mean square residual .12 .15 .09 .08 .08 .08
d.f. 125 130 80 85 24 24
χ2 266.78 293.08 191.79 230.32 51.81 51.81
Change in χ2 26.30* 38.53* 0
Change in d.f. 5 5 0
*p < .05.
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